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This Article undertakes a systematic rebuttal to the arguments made by Supreme Court
nominees and others that Court nominees are constrained, in their Senate hearings on
possible confirmation, from expressing their specific views on legal issues and cases of
the day. It argues that nominee articulation of such case-specific views is not only
permissible, it is necessary for the Senate, and for the country, to learn anything
meaningful about the Court, the nominees, the Constitution, and the relationship
between them.
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INTRODUCTION
Civic sophistication and legal literacy in America no doubt should
be increased. We could quarrel about precisely how much improvement
is necessary, but the need for substantial progress is readily visible to
those who care to look. I have confronted the problem when
encountering the first-year law students I have taught every year for the
past decade-and-a-half at various University of California law schools.
Students today do not enter law school-even high-quality law schools
like the University of California, Davis or the University of California,
Berkeley-with remotely as good a grounding in the basics of American
history and government as they did in the mid-199os when I began
teaching at these two schools. Systematic studies confirm this anecdotal
14o8 [Vol. 61: 14o7
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perception: A United States Department of Education National
Assessment of Educational Progress report in 2oo6 concluded that
seventy-five percent of America's students do not receive the level of
civics education necessary to maintain a robust democracy.' Many other
studies make similar findings.
Just as the inadequacies we currently face have been caused by the
gradual and persistent failure or inattention of a variety of institutions-
the federal, state, and local governments, the K-12 and higher education
communities, the bar and the bench, among others-so too will a
comprehensive solution require sustained effort by many. Certainly state
and local education professionals, along with civic education
organizations that operate both nationally' and regionally,4 will be the
most important players. But the federal government, at the highest
levels, also has much work to do. The President needs to highlight this
problem-along with the deficiencies he regularly identifies in math and
science education-in both his public addresses and in the budgets he
sends to Congress. And the federal courts need to open up their
processes -both literally, by allowing cameras into appellate courtrooms'
and figuratively, by writing shorter and more accessible opinions.
i. See ANTHONY D. LUTKUS & ANDREw R. WEISS, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
NATION'S REPORT CARD: CIVIcs 2oo6 (2oo6), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2oo6/2oo7476.pdf.
2. To be sure, there is credible research suggesting the problem may not be as dire as many
suggest. For example, one of my fellow presenters at the Symposium, James Gibson, has done
research that seeks to prove that "[e]ven though widely accepted, the image of the American people as
ignorant about courts rests upon a remarkably thin layer of empirical evidence," and that "the
American people know orders of magnitude more about their Supreme Court than most other studies
have documented." James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldiera, Knowing the Supreme Court? A
Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 430 (2009). But I would argue
that the questions on which Gibson tests the public, while important and interesting, set the legal
literacy bar too low. For example, Gibson reports that sixty-eight percent of respondents correctly
answered a yes/no question about whether the Supreme Court has ruled on abortion matters, and
sixty-six percent correctly answered "yes" to the question whether the Supreme Court has ruled on the
voting rights of black Americans. Id. at 434. While two-thirds of respondents answering these yes/no
questions correctly is, I suppose, better than would be achieved by random guessing (which would
yield a fifty percent correct-answer rate), I see this glass as one-third empty rather than two-thirds full.
More importantly, knowing that the Court has ruled is just the starting point for informed Americans.
Knowing how it ruled and why it ruled that way ought to be the educational aspiration.
3. One national organization that I have worked with for many years-whose institutional
design is creative and, I think, quite pedagogically effective-is the Center for Civic Education. See
Center for Civic Education, www.civiced.org (last visited June 24, 2010) (offering a wealth of
information for those interested in their work).
4. Operation Protect and Defend, a regional organization with which I have recently become
involved, is doing interesting work in high schools in Northern California and the Central Valley, using
practicing lawyers and seminal Supreme Court cases to introduce constitutional principles to
teenagers.
5. In a recent dustup, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, blocked the Northern District
of California from broadcasting to other federal courthouses the trial over the constitutionality of
Proposition 8, California's ban on same-sex marriages. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705
(2010) (granting stay of the district court's decision to allow limited broadcasting). This illustrates that
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In this Article, I look carefully at another federal body, the United
States Senate, and the way it performs one of the most important tasks
assigned to it-consideration of United States Supreme Court nominees.
If the Senate understood its constitutional prerogatives and discharged
its constitutional duties better in this realm, it could perform an
invaluable service in teaching all Americans the basics about the most
important of legal and civic documents, the United States Constitution.
The Senate confirmation hearings provide a compelling forum for
civic and legal education for a number of reasons. First, the hearings are
televised and available to be seen and heard rather than just perused on
paper, an important feature in an era when video is King and reading of
text alone seems to be in decline. And the personal drama and human
interest dimensions of the hearings make them much more captivating
than written judicial opinions could ever be, even ones that are written to
be accessible. Second, because the hearings allow the questioning
Senators and the answering nominees to address a handful of
constitutional cases and issues at one sitting-and to talk about
relationships between these various cases and issues-the hearings can
offer far more instruction than could any single judicial opinion or oral
argument. Relatedly, written opinions are necessarily and invariably
cluttered with hypertechnical content and procedural detail that is of
the Justices have a long way to go in understanding the value of public judicial proceedings. Not only
did the Justices reach out to decide a question (whether the Northern District had allowed sufficient
time for public comment before changing its local rules to permit broadcast) that did not on its face
seem cert-worthy and on which there was no lower court split, the Justices also suggested that nothing
is lost when trials are not broadcast. See id. at 713 ("While applicants [seeking to block broadcast]
have demonstrated the threat of harm they face if trial is broadcast, respondents have not alleged any
harm if the trial is not broadcast."). As my fellow Symposium presenter Bob Egelko pointed out in his
remarks, whether or not respondents alleged any harm arising from non-broadcast, certainly media
amici did. Bob Egelko, Reporter, S.F. Chronicle, Address at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium:
Democracy and the Courts: Judicial Selection, Legal Literacy, and the Role of Public Opinion (Feb.
19, 2010) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
There are, to be sure, special due process concerns surrounding the litigants that might
counsel against indiscriminate broadcast of all trials. A trial such as that involving Proposition 8, and
most appellate hearings, would seem to present strong cases in favor of broadcast, in order to educate
the public about the way courts really operate.
6. As for length, consider two recent blockbuster rulings. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2oo8), the case holding that the Second Amendment contains an individual rights
component, was over fifty thousand words, and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (20oo), holding
that the First Amendment prohibits limitations on political expenditures of domestic corporations, was
over sixty thousand words. There are many possible factors that might explain the increased length of
Supreme Court opinions in the last generation, including the improvements in word processing
systems, the decreased number of cases the Court decides each year, and the increased influence of
law clerks (who may be less confident than their bosses and thus feel the need to canvass more
tangential issues) in drafting opinions. The fact that the Court may be writing more for lower courts
and lawyers than for the American public may also be part of the explanation. Judges and Justices may




importance only to the parties and lawyers involved in a particular
litigation. Third, the hearings occur periodically (and ideally at least once
every four to eight years),' and thus provide good opportunities for
"refresher" courses, even for those citizens already well versed in law
and policy.
The big question is not whether high-quality hearings could
accomplish significant education; they could. The real question is
whether we can ever have high-quality hearings. On that question, I am
much less certain.
The key shortcoming of the hearings that have been taking place in
recent decades is that nominees avoid answering-and Senators let
nominees get away without answering -specific questions about specific
cases in specific areas of the law. But, as with all areas of high school or
post-secondary education, true learning and understanding requires
some consideration of specifics. Discussions of abstract concepts like
"separation of powers," the "role of individual liberties in society," or
the "proper function of the Judiciary" simply have no meaningful
content unless they are applied to particulars. The same can be said for
the notions of "respect for states' rights," "judicial activism," "strict
construction," and the like.
Perhaps a few examples can help make the point. Justice Scalia is
famously a "textualist" and an "originalist,"8  and yet has (openly)
ignored the plain text and original history of the Eleventh Amendment
in deciding cases about states' rights.' He has also avoided invoking and
discussing the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause in propounding his view that the Constitution is
"colorblind" and admits of no race-based affirmative action.'0 These
cases would seem to make him a rather more complicated
textualist/originialist than might initially be supposed. And the same kind
of complexity exists for Justices whose votes differ from Justice Scalia's;
7. Term limits for Supreme Court Justices would not necessarily require constitutional
amendment and could occur like clockwork once every two years. See Roger C. Cramton,
Constitutionality of Reforming the Supreme Court by Statute, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMrrs
FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 345, 345-6o (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2oo6);
Thomas W. Merrill, Internal Dynamics of Term Limits for Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICEs, supra, at 225, 225.
8. See Vikram D. Amar, Morse, School Speech, and Originalism, 42 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 637, 645
(2009) ("Originalism is a term used modernly to describe a particular approach to constitutional (and
sometimes statutory) interpretation that seeks to understand and apply the text of the document as
'intelligent and informed people of the time' of enactment would have." (footnote omitted) (quoting
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutman ed.,
I997))).
9. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (x999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 5x7 U.S. 44 (1996);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. Ix(s989).
io. See Amar, supra note 8, at 654-58.
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Justice Breyer, for example, in his book, Active Liberty, extols the virtue
of deferring to the deliberate will of elected branches, but curiously
never explains how his approach can be harmonized with his actions in
the so-called partial-birth abortion cases."
Indeed, when it comes to general questions about legal philosophies,
virtually everyone is in some non-trivial measure a "textualist" in that
almost everyone starts the interpretive journey by looking at the text of
the Constitution. Similarly, everyone does care to some extent about the
"history and intent" behind a constitutional provision, 2 and all persons
give at least a little weight to stare decisis" and so forth. What matters is
how a jurist-or how constitutional interpretation itself-balances all
these factors (and others) and resolves conflicts among them. To know
something about the Constitution and a nominee's approach to it, one
must get a feel for what combination of methodological ingredients a
nominee finds most persuasive in particular settings. This can be seen
only in the context of specific past or present controversies. When
William Brennan and Antonin Scalia would offer the same basic answer
to a Senator's question about judicial meta-philosophy (as is often true of
the questions Senators ask), the question is nigh useless.
The Supreme Court itself has essentially voiced agreement with this
idea. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court struck down a
Minnesota law that permitted each state court judicial election candidate
to discuss his or her general philosophy of judging but forbade him or her
from "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues."' 4 The Court noted that allowing "general" discussions of case law
and philosophy while at the same time foreclosing specific statements of
specific views of candidates does not provide the public with the relevant
information it needs." As Justice Scalia explained for the White majority,
"like most other philosophical generalities, [general statements of
judicial philosophy] ha[ve] little meaningful content for the electorate
unless [they are] exemplified by application to a particular issue of
ii. Compare STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
2005 (discussing generally the virtue of judicial deference to deliberative majoritarian political
processes), with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2ooo) (invalidating, without clear textual
warrant and just five years before Justice Breyer's book was published, a Nebraska law that seemed to
be consistent with the national sentiment expressed through deliberative processes).
12. Recently confirmed Associate Justice Elena Kagan made this point during her confirmation
hearings in the summer of 2010, in which she observed, perhaps paraphrasing President John F.
Kennedy's famous line about Berlin, "we are all originalists." See Posting of David Ingram to the BLT:
The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2oio/o6/kagan-we-are-all-originalists.html
(June 29, 2010, 9:22 EST).
13. All persons, that is, except perhaps Justice Clarence Thomas. See Amar, supra note 8, at 647
("No member of the Court over the last century has been so open and cavalier about his disdain for
the constraining nature of precedent, at least in the constitutional setting.").
14. 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
i5. Id. at 772-73.
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construction likely to come before a court-for example, whether a
particular statute runs afoul of any provision of the Constitution."' 6
As commonsensical as this observation seems to be, not everyone
seems to get it. Consider, for example, Chief Justice John Roberts. As
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was preparing for her own confirmation
hearings almost three decades ago, a young John Roberts working in the
Reagan administration advised her to avoid commenting on specific past
Court rulings, and to limit her remarks to matters of general philosophy
or methodology. Roberts wrote to then-nominee O'Connor a short
memo in 1981, in which he observed, on the usefulness (or, to his mind,
lack thereof) of specific case queries by Senators: "If nominees will lie
concerning their philosophy they will lie in response to specific questions
as well."" Even if this were true, it completely misses the point. The
problem with general philosophical questions is not that they will yield
lies, but rather that they will yield truths that are too generic and broad
to be informative or helpful. We should not (and need not) assume that
nominees for the Supreme Court-almost all of whom are going to be
very honorable people-will lie under oath before the Senate. The utility
of asking specific case queries doesn't arise from a fear that nominees
will lie in response to the general questions. Instead, it comes from the
information that only case-specific discussion can produce.
Thus, the only way to become meaningfully educated-whether you
are a United States Senator or a United States denizen-on the meaning
of the Constitution and a Supreme Court nominee's approach to
deciding constitutional disputes is to dig beneath general labels and
examine specific historically important cases, constitutional controversies,
and the nominee's statements and views about them. When I give a
constitutional law exam, if I were to allow students to answer a question
without requiring them to comment on specific cases, what the cases
mean, whether the cases were correctly decided, and why or why not, I
would learn nothing from or about the test takers.
Yet this kind of substantive national constitutional seminar in the
Senate may not easily happen, because over the years many Senators-
even seemingly diligent Senators-reflexively and unwisely seem to have
conceded that while it is appropriate to ask a nominee about her general
approach to judging and interpretation, it is not permissible to ask for
detailed views about actual cases. The record of recent confirmations
shows innumerable instances of the Senate allowing the nominees simply
not to answer because a question asks for specific views on specific
matters. Justice Alito's refusal to discuss one of the great legal issues of
r6. Id. at 773.
17. Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen., to Sandra Day




our day, the constitutional rules surrounding the prosecution of the so-
called "War on Terror" is typical. In response to a question asking for his
thoughts on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 8 Alito
responded: "The issue presented in Hamdi is one that may come before
the Court and therefore it would not be appropriate for me to comment
on any of the opinions in that case."' 9 Other recently confirmed (and
some not-so-recently confirmed) Justices have undertaken similar
dodges. Justice Sotomayor did so with respect to, among many others,
major cases on the Takings Clause,20 presidential power," the Sentencing
Guidelines," and the Voting Rights Act.23 Chief Justice Roberts dodged
questions on cases involving the Sentencing Guidelines,4 an individual's
constitutional right to bear arms,25  gender-based discrimination,
affirmative action,27 abortion," the death penalty,29 and Bush v. Gore.3 o
Indeed, this pattern of refusal to answer case-specific questions is so
pronounced that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg could nonchalantly say, of
herself and the other eight members of the Court in 2002, that "every
Member of this Court declined to furnish such information to the
Senate."
But if it is not permissible or tenable to ask a nominee for specific
views about specific cases, there is little point in even having a hearing.
There may be some entertainment value, but the educational value is
miniscule and in some respects negative.
I. ASSESSING THE OBJECTIONS To SPECIFIC, ESPECIALLY CASE-SPECIFIC,
INQUIRIES
The reason almost always offered by nominees to justify a refusal to
answer specific case queries is some variant of the idea Justice Alito
18. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
19. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr To Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 784
(2oo6) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing] (statement of then-Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
20. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor To Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ii ith Cong. 81-
82 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing] (statement of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor).
21. Id. at 112.
22. Id. at 149.
23. Id. at 384.
24. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 582
(2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of then-Judge John G. Roberts).
25. See id. at 594.
26. See id. at 6o8.
27. See id. at 6o6.
28. See id. at 575.
29. See id. at 585.
30. See id. at 579; see also Bush v. Gore, 538 U.S. 98 (2000).
38. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 807 n.8 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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asserted above with respect to Hamdi-that for a Supreme Court
nominee to comment on the correctness vel non of a past Court decision
or opinions written within it would be to prejudge the issues presented in
that ruling, thus making it hard, if not impossible, for the nominee to
participate in future cases, after the hoped-for confirmation, in which
those issues might recur. This is, in a word, rubbish.
For starters, let us note the staggering breadth of justification
offered. As the Supreme Court has observed in White, if we define what
is out of bounds by what is "likely to come before the courts," we will
have excluded everything, because "[t]here is almost no legal or political
issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an American court, state
or federal, of general jurisdiction."32
More importantly, if a nominee violates principles of good judging
and judicial ethics by giving his views on a past case that raises recurring
issues, why would not the same be true for the sitting Justices themselves
who-in written public opinions and dissents-have stated their views in
the very same past case? Would anyone seriously contend that these
sitting Justices, who have spoken on an issue in a case, are thereby
disqualified from participating in another case at a later time that
presents the same or similar questions? Is Justice Stevens precluded from
hearing any case involving the effect of the Second Amendment on state
and local gun regulation because he is on record in the District of
Columbia v. Heller ruling as believing at that time that the Second
Amendment does not protect individuals?3 3 Of course not. He is still
available and well suited to hear the later case, precisely because he is
free to change his mind if he becomes convinced to come out another
way. With regard to the Second Amendment, the fact that his mind is not
empty does not mean it is not open, and open-mindedness is all that
judicial ethics and due process for litigants require. This too was
confirmed by the Supreme Court in the White ruling, where the majority
pointed out that the ABA rules of judicial ethics do not prevent
discussion of specific views, but require instead only that a judge's
mindset not be fixed or predetermined.3 4
In response to my argument here, a skeptic might concede that
speaking about the rightness or wrongness of particular cases does not
make a jurist biased or prejudiced per se, but the skeptic might
nonetheless suggest that the practice is problematic and thus something
32. Id. at 772 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry
Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)).
33. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2oo8) (Stevens, J., concurring).
34. White, 536 U.S. at 773 n.5 (discussing the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
prohibits only "statements that commit or appear to commit" a candidate, not those which involve
discussion of a candidate's tentative views); see also id. at 786 (discussing the lack of a national
consensus that mere discussion of specific issues is ethically problematic).
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to be avoided if possible. The situation of a sitting Justice would be
distinguished from that of a nominee, according to this suggestion,
because unlike nominees, Justices simply have no way of doing their jobs
without voting (and explaining the votes) in cases that come before them.
This counterargument does not move me. Putting aside whether a
Justice has to offer explanatory opinions or instead could simply register
votes," I would argue that just as a sitting Justice has a "job to do" in
deciding cases, so too does a nominee have a "job to do" in giving the
Senate and the country information about the kind of Justice she will be,
so that Senators can do their constitutionally assigned job of "[a]dvice
and [c]onsent."36 In what other setting would Americans find it remotely
plausible that someone being interviewed for a position could decline to
answer questions about how she would have handled real world
situations where past employees had done things that either pleased or
displeased the ultimate employer (who, in the case of the Supreme
Court, would be the American people)?
Moreover, if sitting Justices and judges are justified in talking about
the merits of cases only because they have to in order to resolve the cases
in front of them, how could one ever explain or defend the quite
common practice of Justices and judges talking about the merits of cases
in other settings, such as law review articles and speeches? Many Justices
and judges regularly analyze, assess, critique, and speculate on past and
future types of cases in their extrajudicial speeches and writings, and
these activities are not only permitted, they are, as the Court in White
reminded, encouraged by the canons of judicial ethics.37
If all this weren't enough, the concessions and exceptions that
nominees regularly make to their "it is not appropriate to discuss specific
cases" stance completely undermine the coherence of their position.
Under-inclusiveness between a purported end and the means employed
to promote it often suggests an incoherence or insincerity about the end.
The lack of fit between nominees' asserted justifications for not
answering and their actual practice is quite striking.
For starters, nominees sometimes do (perhaps when they slip up)
comment on past cases that raise issues likely to come before the Court.
For example, just a few transcript pages away from where he refused to
discuss Hamdi, Justice Alito embraced Miranda v. Arizona" (a quite
contentious case still being debated in myriad ways) and said that
35. For a good recent survey of reasons why judges should write opinions in the first place and
the related question of what precedential effect opinions should have, see Danny J. Boggs & Brian P.
Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D IT 18 (2000).
36. U.S. CoNsi. art. II, § 2.
37. See White, 536 U.S. at 779; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2004) (encouraging
teaching, writing, and lecturing on the law).
38. 384 U.S. 436 (3966).
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concerns he had about the case earlier in his career had been "allayed"
by subsequent developments.39 He also said he agreed with the Court's
decision to wade into the political redistricting thicket in Baker v. Carr,40
a ruling he felt free to weigh in on because he thought "the issue decided
in Baker is unlikely to come before... the Supreme Court."4' How does
he know what issues will arise over the course of a thirty- or forty-year
Supreme Court tenure? Did anyone think in 1976 that the Second
Amendment's application to individuals and states would come before
the Court in Justice Stevens's career?42
Other Justices are similarly inconsistent in ways that fundamentally
undermine their reasons for not answering some questions. Chief Justice
Roberts was particularly erratic. For example, he said he would apply43
the three-category test for congressional Commerce Clause power laid
out by the Court in United States v. Lopez," even though that framework
is surely something in dispute. Indeed, one of the current Justices-
Justice Thomas-has eschewed using it in his separate writings in recent
Commerce Clause cases.45 Chief Justice Roberts also said at numerous
points-in response to direct questions about whether he "agreed" with
particular decisions-that he had "no quarrel" with them, including the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio to extend the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to states,46 and the so-called "intermediate scrutiny" approach to
gender discrimination 47 set forth in United States v. Virginia,4 as well as
the outcomes in Griswold v. Connecticut" and Eisenstadt v. Baird,"o both
of which are contentious contraception cases.5
Why is it acceptable to voice "no quarrel" with some cases (likely to
present recurring issues-as the exclusionary rule's application to states
and the framework to assess gender-based laws do), but not other cases?
Sensing his own inconsistency, Chief Justice Roberts later explained that
when he used the phrase "I have no quarrel" with a ruling, it meant only
that he viewed that ruling as a true precedent of the Court that may or
39. See Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note i9, at 774.
40. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 19, at 812.
42. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (20o8) (discussing the application of the
Second Amendment to individuals); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
43. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 24, at 593.
44. 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
46. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 24, at 589; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643, 66o
(i961).
47. Id. at 35. Note that this too is an issue over which current Justices, such as Justice Scalia, have
disagreed. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575-76 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. 518 U.S. at 553.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
S I Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 24, at 612.
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may not warrant overruling based on the general considerations bearing
on stare decisis." In other words, having "no quarrel" with something
simply meant he acknowledged its existence-he had no quarrel with the
fact that it was in the U.S. Reports. But then why did he choose that
phrase only in answering questions about some cases and not others?
Surely he has no "quarrel" in this "they exist on the books" sense with
Roe v. Wade5 or Grutter v. Bollinger or many other cases on which he
refused to comment altogether, saying that he could make no statements
because the issues in these cases might recur.
Justice Ginsburg was similarly inconsistent; to take but one
example, she suggested she believed that the Lemon v. Kurtzman" test
for Establishment Clause cases was not only the test currently being
used, but that as far as she could tell there was no better alternative."
And Justice Sotomayor, who perhaps commented on case specifics the
least, nonetheless did so in various settings, including the framework that
she "would apply to any new case" under the Clean Water Act.
And most participants seem to concede that nominees can and
should talk about their own past statements and writings about specific
cases (statements they made from the bench or elsewhere) in front of the
Senate." Yet this concession gives away the game; if a nominee can
explain, justify, clarify, modify, or disavow what she has written about a
legal issue in the past without "prejudging" or "committing to a
resolution of" that issue in the future, then why can't the same be said for
her view about what other jurists have written? Just as then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist in his confirmation hearings for Chief Justice in 1986
could have properly-without making any impermissible promises-told
Senators that his own particular prior Supreme Court writings accurately
reflected his constitutional vision (and no one could really doubt that this
would have been proper), so too can nominee John Roberts explain to
Senators that he agrees or disagrees with particular opinions of
Rehnquist or others.
Similarly devastating is the concession that a nominee's "general"
philosophy is fair grounds for seminar questioning. Why do a nominee's
52. Id. at 574.
53. 410 U.S. 13 ('973).
54. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
56. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jo3d Cong. 179 (1993) [hereinafter
Ginsburg Confirmation Hearing] (statement of then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
57. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 20, at 437; Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
58. See, e.g., Ginsburg Confirmation Hearing, supra note 56, at 184; see also Sotomayor
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 20, at 337 (directing the Committee to her own past cases that
demonstrate her jurisprudential predisposition to defer to Congress in various matters).
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statements about a general philosophy not amount to "prejudging" with
respect to that philosophy? For example, if a nominee says in response to
a query about the use of foreign materials in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution that such materials have no legitimate role to play, is she
foreclosed from reconsidering that position in the context of a
subsequent dispute? If so, then why are questions about these topics
permissible and in fact permitted?59 The same could be said for discussions
during the hearings-in which nominees do regularly engage-about
precedent and super precedent and super-duper precedent.' Are these
questions improperly asked? If so, why have they been answered? And if
they are not improper because the candidate is free later to change her
mind, the same lack of commitment applies to views on specific past
cases, not just to views on big ideas like the use of foreign materials and
the role of stare decisis.
A. LIMITS ON THE FORM OF THE SEMINAR QUESTIONING
So it simply cannot be that a nominee's willingness to answer
questions and offer views about past cases is inherently and intractably
problematic. But, as in any good seminar, we must pay heed not just to
the subject matter of the proceedings, but also the form in which we take
the matter up. Crucially, the questions by the Senators and the answers
by the nominees should be worded carefully so as to avoid any inference
or impression that the Senate is seeking-or the nominee is giving in
order to get confirmed-promises, or commitments of how she will rule
in the future. Explicit or even implicit promises about future rulings are
out of bounds-such promises, if either sought or offered, would indeed
compromise judicial independence and due process of law. Our
Constitution sets up three independent branches; the judiciary is not
supposed to be bound to do Congress's or the President's bidding.
The Supreme Court in White already recognized this key
distinction-between permissible predictive information on the one
hand, and impermissible promises on the other. In striking down the
limitation on a candidate's "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues," the Court was careful to point out that
Minnesota elsewhere prohibited each judicial candidate from making a
"pledge" or "promise" to decide a particular issue in a particular way, a
prohibition that was not being challenged and as to which the Court did
59. Judge Sotomayor answered such questions. See Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note
20, at 442.
6o. See, e.g., Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 24, at 614 (indicating that then-Judge
Roberts "would of course be guided by [the] very same factors [the Court has identified] in deciding




not express any skepticism.61 Indeed, as noted earlier, the Court cited the
ABA canon on this "anti-promise" notion, suggesting judicial ethics and
due process are served by it.62
The distinction between general philosophy and specific case views
offered to refuse to engage in the seminar is, then, incoherent and
unworkable (as I intimated a decade-and-a-half ago in my Yale Law
Journal Note3). Instead, as elaborated here, the relevant distinction is
between an informed prediction (which permissibly may be sought and
as to which a nominee may change his or her mind without constraint)
and a promise (which should not be requested or given).
B. ARE ELECTIONS INHERENTLY DIFFERENT THAN CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS?
But does the White analytic framework for judicial elections, upon
which I am drawing, have applicability outside the election setting to the
distinct process of federal judge confirmation hearings? Should White's
observations be limited to the context of the case?64 Might a nominee's
statements in a Senate hearing be more problematic than are similar
statements made directly to the public in the form of actual prior
opinions, speeches, law review articles, judicial campaign literature, and
the like?
I am open to someone making the case, but at present I do not see
much force in it. For starters, I should note that the empirical work done
after White seems to indicate that the fears the dissenters expressed, that
discussion by judicial election candidates of specific topics would breed
cynicism and distrust of judicial open-mindedness, seem unfounded; if
anything, opening the process up to more substantive discussion of
judicial policymaking seems to have enhanced the legitimacy of the
6j. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 780 (2002) (noting that the prohibition on
"pledges or promises" is not under challenge).
62. Id. at 773 n.5.
63. Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1II, 1122 n.6o (1988); see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 1o5 YALE L.J. 549, 572-75
(1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)).
64. It is true, of course, that White involved a law that prohibited judicial candidates from
speaking their minds, rather than a rule that would require judicial candidates to open up. It is also
true that the majority in White did not say that Minnesota's legitimate objectives were not furthered at
all by the prohibition on issue-specific comments. Nonetheless, by debunking the state's interests and
showing they are not very weighty, White devastates the nominees' arguments that they have strong
reasons for doing what they do, especially in light of the Senate's and the public's need to know what
judicial attitudes will be added to the Court by a new member. In this way, Justice Ginsburg's dissent
in White, suggesting that the majority's reasoning casts doubt on the legitimacy of the evasive practice
of Court nominees, was correct. See 536 U.S. at 807 n.s (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6 1: 14o71420
SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
judicial branch post-White. And citizens seem to express a desire for
more of that kind of specific information.6
Moreover, because a federal nominee can carefully qualify her
statements to the Senate-and make clear she is not making any
promises-more easily than she can in other settings, answering the
Senate's questions creates less risk of improper appearances than do
statements made in other settings. Thirty-second campaign ads on TV
allow for less detail, nuance, and sophistication than do five-minute oral-
exam style answers in the Senate Judiciary Committee meeting room. On
top of all that, consider Article III's guarantee of life tenure.t Because of
this unique judicial job security in the federal system (and it is interesting
that no states embrace it entirely) any "deals" in the federal arena are
much less enforceable than they would be in states where judges must
stand for reconfirmation elections and/or are susceptible to the recall
device. Thus, the Senate is a place where it is less, not more, problematic
for a nominee to state his views without appearing to be making deals.
Remember too that, given media coverage, the public is given ample
opportunity to understand well that Supreme Court nominees are picked
by Presidents based on specific things they have done (and the views
those things represent) in their lives prior to the moment of their
nomination. Because of this societal recognition, nobody would think the
Senate is extracting any untoward bargains when it asks a nominee to
share preconceived views that likely accounted for the nominee having
been picked in the first place.
The Court's analysis in White was itself keenly attentive to these
issues of public perception that go beyond any actual impropriety." In
discussing both the problem of judicial "partiality" and the appearance of
65. See generally James L. Gibson, "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State
High Courts, 71 J. POL. 1285 (2009) (providing empirical support for the idea that the legitimacy of
state courts does not drop when candidates for judicial election discuss specific legal issues during the
campaign, and that the electorate wants such information). Professor Gibson's data might even suggest
that "commitments" or promises by judicial candidates do not undermine legitimacy, but he
acknowledges that his research might not answer that question, since the queries of respondents
concerning candidate promises were phrased not in terms of promises on specific issues but rather
promises simply to abide by the will of the people. See id. at 1291 n.16. I would add that even if
legitimacy in the eyes of the public is unaffected by candidate promises, the due process rights of
future litigants are.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § r.
67. For example, as Justice Scalia pointed out, since judges and judicial candidates state their
substantive views on legal issues all the time, in a variety of settings, before they are formally
candidates, the public understands that no expression of views by someone prior to his taking the
bench involves problematic commitments. White, 536 U.S. at 779-80 (discussing the innocuous nature
of nonpromissory statements, likening them to earlier views expressed by sitting jurists). Indeed, note
that even the dissenters in White thought it might be permissible and beneficial for a candidate for
high judicial office to state his or her specific views; the bigger dispute in White was over the use of




partiality, the White Court highlighted the importance of the separate
provision in Minnesota law (echoing the ABA's national standards)
prohibiting any statements that either "commit or appear to commit" a
candidate to any position. 8 In light of this prohibition, the Court said, the
State's separate additional ban on candidates announcing their current
views about contested legal or political matters did not do very much in
accomplishing Minnesota's asserted interest in avoiding an appearance of
69impropriety."
The White Court also drew another distinction designed to avoid
improper appearances-a distinction between issues and parties. A judge
is not "partial" just because he has preconceived leanings about legal
issues (so long as he will read the briefs with an open mind). His
subsequent decisions will be problematic only if he has, or has expressed,
preconceived leanings in favor of or against particular parties.0 Thus, so
long as a judge applies his legal views-even long-held and long-
expressed legal views- evenhandedly to all parties (and avoids talking
about actual parties likely to come before him), he is not doing anything
that suggests an appearance of impropriety, let alone any actual
impropriety. As the White Court observed:
Indeed, even if it were possible to select judges who did not have
preconceived views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do
so. "Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a
complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would
be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."7'
Not everyone seems to be convinced that public perceptions of
impropriety can be avoided if case-specific queries are permitted. Again,
a young John Roberts sounded a discordant note in this regard in the
memo to nominee Sandra Day O'Connor, described above.72 In
particular, Roberts rejected the crucial idea offered here (and embraced
by the Court in White) that answers to specific case questions are okay so
long as they don't take the form of promises or pledges. According to
Roberts, even if a promise is disclaimed, "[t]he appearance of impropriety
remains."74
While attentiveness to appearances is appropriate and perhaps
required, an extreme and excessive fear that some people might
misunderstand the nature of a proceeding-and see an illicit deal where
none exists-simply cannot justify the Senate's abdication of its "advice
and consent" duties. Some people might think a nominee's simply
68. Id. at 770, 773 n.5 (majority opinion).
69. See id. at 780.
70. See id. at 775-77.
7!. Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.)).
72. See Memorandum from John Roberts, supra note 17.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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showing up to a Senate hearing constitutes an improper promise by the
nominee to later rule as the Senate wishes. The question is not what
someone out there might think-the question is what reasonable, well-
informed people would understand.
Consider, in this regard, another opinion written by Justice Scalia-
his in-chambers opinion last decade in Cheney v. United States District
Court, where he explained his decision not to recuse himself in that
case,75 notwithstanding the flack over his famous "duck hunting" trip.76 In
particular, in Cheney, Justice Scalia reminded us all that judicial ethics
decisions-such as what judges should say in public and when they
should hear cases, and so forth-should be based on an assumption that
the public knows the true facts, not some stylized version of the facts?
In the context of Supreme Court nominations, this means we should
assume the public knows that Senators are careful to disclaim seeking
promises, that Article III's grant of lifetime tenure to federal judges
makes promises almost impossible to enforce and thus unlikely to be
made, and that Presidents pick nominees based on predictions of how the
nominees will likely vote in specific cases. Once a member of the public
understands all of this, careful senatorial questioning of a nominee about
his views of past cases raises no appearance of impropriety.
Justice Scalia's Cheney opinion also illustrates a central theme of
this Article-that the government must do a good job of educating the
public, so that laypeople do not labor under misconceptions, and that the
remedy for remotely possible appearances of impropriety is often not
reduced participation by officials, but rather more education by officials.
II. LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SENATE SEMINAR AND How THEY
CAN BE OVERCOME
Like all other well-run seminars, the Senate confirmation hearings
need to take account of the logistical constraints imposed by the format
of the meetings. Students in my class sometimes say, when called upon,
that they do not know or remember enough of the detail to meaningfully
answer my query. Similarly, sometimes a Supreme Court nominee might
say in response to a request that he offer views on a prior Supreme Court
ruling something like: "I haven't read all the briefs in the case about
which you ask, so I'm not sure which result makes the most sense."
This might be a fair response, just as my students' pleas of
temporary ignorance are sometimes perfectly understandable. What I
tell my students is that I will ask them the question again tomorrow,
75. 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.).
76. For one of the many news/editorial accounts of the duck hunting trip and the ethical issues it
raised in the minds of many Americans, see David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight
on Scalia, L.A. TIMES, JIan. I7, 20o4, at Ai.
77. 54' U.S. at 923-24-
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when they have given it some thought. And what the Senate should tell
an unprepared nominee is that he may get back to them in a few weeks
with a five-page memo outlining which opinions he found persuasive
after having had a chance to read the briefs and the oral argument
transcripts (the way real Justices have to do when they vote on a case
only a few weeks after having read the briefs). If, instead, the nominee
offers something like: "I can't be sure how I would vote until I know that
the outcome of a real world case actually turns on my vote," the
comeback ought to be: "We're not asking you to analyze an abstract
hypothetical- the fact that there's a published Supreme Court opinion
on the merits means there was a concrete and ripe controversy here. And
to the extent that your sense today about how you would have voted is
imperfect because your views won't count in the actual ruling in that
case, we will take it for whatever it might be worth."
To be sure, a written response by the nominee is less instructive
than an "oral exam" answer for the viewing American public, but the
Fourth Estate and the army of bloggers can do a good job excerpting,
dissecting, and characterizing the nominee's effort when it has been
turned in a few weeks later.
A. WHICH SPECIFICS To ASK ABOUT?
Each time I teach a course, I must spend some time assembling a
syllabus. Often I can borrow extensively from the syllabus I used when I
last taught that same or a similar course. Sometimes I can draw from
syllabi that my colleagues throughout the country have recently used in
their similar courses. The same techniques are available to a Senator
looking to examine nominees about the Constitution and their
understandings of it. There are some cases about which discussion should
recur across many confirmation hearings for years if not decades. And
there are likely to be cases decided since the last confirmation hearing
was held that should be included in the new "discuss list," 8 either to
supplement or to replace earlier content. And Senators should consult
each other and should consult constitutional analysts throughout the
country as they assemble the materials and questions for each
confirmation hearing iteration. For me, the criteria for being considered
on the hearing syllabus include: (i) the presence of at least one major
contested constitutional question whose resolution has significant real-
world and symbolic implications even today; (2) a dispute in which
78. 1 use the term "discuss list" in a conscious attempt to refer to the setting in which that term is
most commonly used. At the Supreme Court, the "discuss list" is "a list of cases, circulated by the
Chief Justice [with prior input from his fellow Justices] shortly before a scheduled conference, that are
considered worthy enough to take the time of the Justices at the conference for discussion and voting."
ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, & KENNETH GELLER, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE I3 (8th ed. 2002).
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various Justices seem to use different methodological tools to resolve the
controversy, such that the opinions shed light on the key differences in
interpretive approaches various Justices employ; (3) the presence of a
passionate dissent so that the nominee can be asked to explain which
opinion(s) she finds most convincing and why; (4) straightforward but
well-developed factual records, so that nominees cannot avoid
addressing the case by asking for more facts not discernible; and (5)
significant documented reaction to the ruling by other branches of
government and by the academy, offering a variety of critiques and
defenses of the various opinions.
Although there are probably a few dozen or so cases likely to
appear on many informed constitutional scholars' list of top cases that
warrant discussion, my own current short list might include the following
ten telling decisions (presented in no particular order):
First, Grutter v. Bollinger.7 In this case, Justice O'Connor (who has
since been replaced by Samuel Alito) wrote for a bare five-member
majority to permit the University of Michigan Law School to use the
minority race of certain underrepresented applicant groups as a flexible
plus-factor in the admissions process in order to assemble a diverse
student body against a challenge brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." To agree with the four dissenters
is to condemn virtually all race-based programs by both public and (since
federal statutes track constitutional standards) private universities. It is
also to downplay or override the reliance that thousands of schools had
placed on Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke twenty-five years earlier, which had embraced
careful race-based diversity plans." Grutter can be usefully compared to,
among other things, the Gratz v. Bollinger companion case, in which the
court invalidated the undergraduate university's admissions program as
making use of race too inflexibly and mechanically.8'
Second, District of Columbia v. Heller.3 In this blockbuster ruling,
the Court held five-to-four that the Second Amendment does indeed
protect individual gun ownership against unreasonable regulation, and
that a total ban on handguns cannot be justified under the Amendment.8'
Among other things, Heller contains involved and intriguing discussion
of the role that original intent does or ought to play in constitutional
79. 539 U.S. 3o6 (2003).
8o. Id. at 31o, 343.
Si. 438 U.S. 265 ('978).
82. 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003).
83. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
84. Id. at 2787, 2822.
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interpretation, the best ways to discern the relevant intent, and what
default rules ought to apply when intent is not clear.
Third, Citizens United v. FEC.86 In this recent case, the Court, by a
sharply divided vote, held that the First Amendment does not permit
government to ban corporations (and presumably labor unions as well)
from expending money on political advertising in direct support or
opposition to candidates for elective office. The decision overruled two
Supreme Court cases of the past two decadesj upset almost a century of
federal statutory restrictions,8 and sets the stage for campaign spending
of uncertain dimensions. The case features interesting discussions of the
extent to which corporations ought to enjoy constitutional rights, the
relevance of originalism in the First Amendment context, and the
threshold for overruling twenty-year-old Supreme Court precedent that
itself had recently been reaffirmed.'
Fourth, Boumediene v. Bush.9' In the most divisive of the so-called
"War on Terror" cases, Justice Kennedy and four other Justices
extended the protections of habeas corpus to the detainees at the U.S.
Naval facility in Guantanamo, Cuba and declared unconstitutional
Congress's efforts to deprive the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction in
these matters.92 Among other things, Boumediene tests understandings of
the scope of executive power, even when the President seems to be
backed by Congress.
Fifth, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.' In this
case, Justice O'Connor joined five others to allow damage suits against
states under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).' The Court
held that the FMLA's authorization of such suits was a valid exercise of
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to remedy gender
inequality. Hibbs is in great tension with earlier Rehnquist Court
rulings sharply limiting Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority-
indeed, to my mind, it effectively guts Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett.6 Hibbs is particularly intriguing and a good case
to discuss because it lies at the intersection of the "new federalism" and
women's rights.
85. See id.
86. 130S. Ct. 876 (2010).
87. Id. at 886, 917.
88. Id. at 882.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2oo8).
92. Id. at 2262, 2274-75.
93. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
94. Id. at 723, 740; see Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2oo6).
95. Id. at 740.
96. 531 U.S. 356 (2ool).
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Sixth, Atkins v. Virginia.9 Here, a six-Justice majority (including
O'Connor) held that execution of mentally-retarded criminals violates
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.#" The
various opinions address how fixed in time the meaning of the
Constitution is, how legitimate it is for Justices to independently assess
the proportionality of punishments, and how relevant foreign legal norms
are to domestic constitutional rights.99
Seventh, McCreary County v. ACLU.& Justice O'Connor joined
four others to strike down Kentucky's display of the Ten
Commandments in its courthouses. 0 ' To embrace Justice Scalia's dissent
is to abandon any requirement of government "neutrality" toward
religion, and to permit significant government promotion of Christian
monotheism.
Eighth, Seminole Tribe v. Florida." In this seemingly technical
Eleventh Amendment dispute about whether States can be sued in
federal courts, Justice O'Connor joined four others to rein in
Congressional power and to protect state prerogatives -even though the
text of the Constitution would indicate otherwise.'" The case thus tests,
among other things, how committed we are to textualism as a consistent
methodology.
Ninth, Lawrence v. Texas.o' In this important ruling, Justice
Kennedy led a five-to-four majority to strike down a law in Texas making
it a crime to engage in same-sex sexual conduct.05 The decision overruled
the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick 6 shed light on the constitutional
protections of intimate sexual decisionmaking, and has potentially
significant ramifications for the debate over the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage bans.
And lastly, Gonzales v. Carhart.'" A five-to-four Court, per Justice
Kennedy, upheld a federal ban on a controversial late-term abortion
procedure just a few years after the Court had struck down a very similar
ban imposed by the State of Nebraska."0s The case permits exploration of,
among other things, the importance of candor by the Court when it is
abandoning its past rulings, and the extent to which the Justices' own
97. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
98. Id. at 305, 321.
99. Id.
oo. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
ioi. Id. at 848, 881.
1o2. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
103. See id. at 46, 72-73 (discussing Articles I and III and the Eleventh Amendment).
104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
1o5. Id. at 56r, 578-79.
xo6. 478 U.S. x86 (1986).
107. 550 U.S. 124 (2oo7)-
xo8. Id. at 130, '68.
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attitudes about the psychological effects abortion procedures may have
on women who receive them should factor into due process analysis.
B. A TEACHER'S MANUAL: PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR RUNNING THE SENATE
SEMINAR
i. Recommendation Number One: Pick Your Spots, Rather than
Trying To Cover The Entire Field of Constitutional Law
New teachers of constitutional law often bite off more than anyone
could chew. Even with a prolonged hearing, Senators could not come
close to examining every important area of constitutional law. Major law
school constitutional law textbooks today are literally hefty (often
weighing over seven pounds) and lengthy (averaging over one thousand
pages, though the one I co-author has considerably more than that)."
Discussing all the material in any one of them, even in a cursory manner,
would take three full semesters, rather than three weeks. Moreover, even
these constitutional casebooks are limited in certain ways. They barely
touch on the so-called "criminal procedure" aspects of the Constitution-
for example, the guarantees of the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, and
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination
and freedom from double jeopardy. Yet these guarantees and privileges
make up a good part of the Supreme Court's docket.
And that docket, of course, is not confined to constitutional
interpretation: Important and vexing statutory interpretation questions
invariably arise in the high Court, demanding that the Court give
meaning to seminal congressional statutes, such as various civil rights
acts and environmental laws. For these reasons, Senators must invariably
pick just a few areas of law to explore with the nominee, in the hopes
that this (hopefully well-chosen) sampling will give a general sense of the
nominee's approach to Supreme Court judging.
2. Recommendation Number Two: Be Concrete; Examples Will
Keep an Audience's Attention
The temporal brevity of the hearings is not the only constraint on
the Senate. Perhaps more important is the attention span of the seminar
audience-the American public, to whom the Senate should be trying to
provide information, and from whom the Senate should then be looking
for feedback. Good teachers know the strengths and weaknesses of their
students, and the Senate's audience has a limited attention span. For this
reason, Senators need, in addition to picking the areas of law upon which
they will focus, to be concrete in their presentation.
1o9. See JONATHAN D. VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS (13th ed. 2009).
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Constitutional law doctrine from the Court contains a lot of abstract
ideas; it asks questions such as whether a regulation of expression is
"narrowly tailored" to its objectives, whether a statute dealing with race
is "necessary to accomplish a compelling interest," and whether a
Congressional imposition on the States is sufficiently "congruen[t] and
proportional[]" to the misdeeds in which States are allegedly engaged."0
But there is simply no way non-lawyers are going to slog through this
kind of jargon and theoretical complexity.
Thus, if Senators of both parties want the American public to
understand what judicial "conservatism" or judicial "liberalism" means
in their daily lives-and that ought to be the goal-then the Committee's
questioning must focus on specific factual contexts in which the various
legal tests get applied. When asking about federal powers, for example,
the Committee should not query the nominee about why the "economic
nature of the regulated activity" (an abstraction the Court often focuses
on)' should be so important. Instead, the Committee should ask the
nominee why some specific national problems-like pollution or the
preservation of endangered species-might, or might not, be able to have
national solutions.
Or suppose Senators want to ask about the Fourth Amendment.
They shouldn't simply ask the nominee what he thinks "unreasonable
searches and seizures" means. Instead, they should ask him why he
thinks arresting a Texas soccer mom in a pickup truck for a seat belt
violation (the facts of a recent Supreme Court case"') was, or was not, a
reasonable seizure of her person.
3. Recommendation Number Three: Be a Sharp Questioner, and
Be Willing To Wield the Power of the Instructor
Everyone who has ever seen the movie The Paper Chase"' knows
that, done well, the process of teaching by questioning is quite powerful.
In light of the reality that nominees will attempt to evade questions,
smart Senators should try to explore a nominee's views about past cases
in a way that is most likely to yield some non-evasive answers. For
example, a question to the nominee asking whether he thinks Roe v.
Wade should be overruled (which I continue to think is a fair question) is
simply not going to be answered in this day and age, unless the nominee's
name is Robert Bork (whom I respected for his general forthrightness
during his hearing). So if the Senate is going to ask about privacy cases,
better to do so without posing only the "ultimate" question.
Ino. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
in . See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6xIo (2000).
112. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323-24 (2001).
113. THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
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Thus, when the nominee declines to express his views on the
legitimacy of Roe, ask him the following: "Many critics of Roe v. Wade
seem to think that Griswold v. Connecticut (involving married couples'
access to contraception) was correctly decided. What do you think about
the distinction between a right to privacy that covers contraception, and
one that covers a right to abortion?"
Similarly, asking a nominee about whether he thinks the Michigan
Law School case 4 upholding some limited race-based affirmative action
was correctly decided is unlikely to yield a straightforward answer. But
how about the following: "What evidence are you aware of that suggests
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to foreclose
race-based affirmative action, and didn't they themselves engage in some
of it?" Questions like these are about cases, but they are not styled
directly in terms of case outcomes. Therefore, they might be more likely
to be answered.
Often, as in the classroom, a little force by the questioner is called
for. So when a nominee, asked to weigh in on particular areas of law in
which the Court has spoken, responds by saying either that the question
would be too abstract to yield a meaningful answer, or that it would be
too specific for him or her to be able to answer and yet still be open-
minded when the issue comes before her on the Court, the reply needs to
be unflinching and direct: "Then why, precisely, may sitting Justices,
who've obviously shared their current thinking in the course of authoring
majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents, continue to hear cases
involving the same recurring issues?"
Sharp, pointed rejoinders may be the only way to sufficiently cajole
the nominee into either answering the question or suffering the public-
image consequences of failing to answer. Just as a good Socratic law
school professor must sometimes exert pressure on students whose
individual participation in the dialogue is necessary for the benefit of all,
so too must Senators be willing to turn the heat up a bit on nominees. Of
course, as in the classroom, the rules should be the same for all persons
in the hot seat-men and women, Democrats and Republicans.
And if nominees persist in refusing to participate in the discussion,
they should either get a failing grade (as in a '"no"9 vote on the Senate
floor for insufficient classroom participation), or at the very least an
"incomplete" grade-which would take the form of a filibuster.
Although the use of filibusters by the Senate is controversial these days,
and perhaps particularly with respect to judicial nominees, I can think of
no better justification for delaying a floor vote than the fact that the
nominee has simply not provided enough information on which an
informed Senate vote can be cast. Such a rationale invokes the best and
I1r4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 53 U.S. 306 (2003).
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most principled justification for the existence of the filibuster device
itself: the desire for a more meaningful and informational process.
4. Recommendation Number Four: Be Flexible and Not Wedded to
a Script
In many areas of legal practice, the question-and-answer sessions
that most effectively yield information tend to be ones where the
questioner is not tied to any set of pre-written queries, but rather can use
impromptu follow-up questions to pursue interesting leads created by
answers to prior questions. This is true of depositions and of live in-court
cross examination, of appellate oral arguments, and of well-run Socratic
classrooms; it should be true of Senate hearings as well.
Of course, this kind of flexibility requires that the questioners really
know their stuff and are comfortable in going "off script." Taking on a
jurist as smart and experienced as then-Judge Alito head-to-head is
surely a daunting task. Judge Alito surely has every incentive to avoid
giving information that might be contentious-indeed, if I were advising
him, I would encourage him to say as little as possible. But what is good
for him might not be good for the Senate or for the country. And no one
said that running this seminar for the American people was going to be
easy.
III. WHY THE SOTOMAYOR HEARINGS WOULD, ON BALANCE, HAVE To
RECEIVE A FAILING GRADE
The Senate seminar in 2009 was quite unhelpful. Perhaps most
vexingly, then-Judge Sotomayor (like other nominees before her) was
able to avoid talking meaningfully about her current views on most of the
major constitutional questions of the day.
Again, I fully understand why Justice Sotomayor did what was in
her best interests (and what I would have advised her to do, if I had been
among those giving her personal advice): say as little of substance as
possible. And Senators, too, may have done what's in their best
interests -coming off as senatorial on TV and not boring the American
people with meaningful discussion of constitutional doctrine. But as I
suggested above, what is in the interests of the nominee and the Senators
may not be in the best interests of the American public. The only way to
truly get a sense of the kind of Justice someone will be is to ask questions
regarding her views of past controversial (often divided) cases from the
Court itself.
Why don't Senators teach themselves and the American public
better? I am not sure. Perhaps some don't feel qualified to engage in
substantive discussion with nominees, although good support staff could
help here (as it does in other classroom settings). Some Senate traditions,
like the filibuster, can be explained by personal selfishness. Individual
Senators-both in the majority and minority parties-are reluctant to
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tinker with the senatorial system of personal privileges and procedural
courtesies, of which the filibuster is but a part, because that system gives
Senators great power to pursue pet projects and extract earmarks for
their home states. Blowing up the filibuster might also mean blowing up
all the unjustified and extravagant personal perks that make being a
Senator so enjoyable. It is unclear to me why similar incentives should
operate to deter Senators from being active and forceful questioners.
Indeed, Senators who do undertake meaningful questioning, and who
make nominees who refuse to answer look silly based on the rejoinders
to the nominees' justifications for refusing to answer, discussed earlier,
might themselves be able to make legitimate use of the filibuster to force
nominees to be more forthcoming. If ever there were a justification for
blocking a floor vote, it would be that the nominee simply has not given
the Senate the information on which a vote could meaningfully be held.
Whatever the reasons for Senate disinclination to substantively
engage the nominees, things have to change or the hearings are at best a
waste of time. Indeed, the hearings for Justice Sotomayor may represent
something worse than simply an educational opportunity lost. In one
important respect, the hearings affirmatively misinformed the American
people. I speak here of the dominant theme of then-Judge Sotomayor's
testimony-from her opening statement, right through to the end-the
theme that " [t]he task of a [federal] judge is not to make law, it is to
apply the law.""5
However nice this sounds, it simply is not true. As my colleague
Erwin Chemerinsky put it: "Every first-year law student knows that
judges make law.""6 State court judges make new law in the areas of
contract, tort and property law, among others. The Supreme Court
fashions law in virtually all of its rulings. To see this clearly, consider two
of the most contentious decisions from last Term-the New Haven
firefighters case"' (featured so prominently in the Sotomayor
hearings"'), and the challenge to the federal Voting Rights Act."9 In both
cases, the Court read a landmark federal statute in a particular way,
likely influenced by the Court's plausible-but by no means necessarily
correct-understanding of the Amendments to the United States
Constitution adopted after the Civil War. In neither case could one argue
with a straight face that the majority's reading of the law was undeniably
compelled by the text of the statute or the words and history of the
Constitution. Both cases were classic judgment calls, in which the
I 15. See, e.g., Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 2o, at 59.
16. Posting of Erwin Chemerinsky to Opinion L.A., http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2009/o7/
sotomayor-hearings-day-two-dust-up.html (July 14, 2009, 19:02 PST).
117. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
x 8. See, e.g., Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 20, at 64-65-
I19. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
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judgment of conservative jurists carried the day. My point here is not
that the Court was wrong in the way it resolved these cases (although I
do have my doubts);o my point is simply that their resolution broke new
legal ground and "made"-in every meaningful sense-new law and
policy.
Why is it bad to deny that judges make law? Even if the idea that
judges don't make law is untrue, can it be characterized as a "white lie"
that makes us all feel better about government? I do not think so,
because denying that judges make law derails us from educating people
about what we should be discussing: the ways in which legitimate judge-
made policy differs from the kinds of policy decisions elected legislators
and presidents fashion.
CONCLUSION
Federal judicial policymaking, when done right, is interstitial-that
is, it is accomplished within the boundaries of statutory and
constitutional parameters. It is also incremental-attendant to the size
and speed of trends and currents in American law, history, economics,
and sociology. It is entirely transparent and explained in a published
format that responds thoroughly to arguments on the other side. Finally,
it is not particularly concerned with the next electoral cycle-even as it is
properly aware of longer-term American attitudes and is responsive to
whether, a generation after a ruling, its leadership has been followed or
rejected. These and other features distinguish judicial lawmaking from
the more freewheeling and sometimes populist actions of the elected
branches.
Ironically, by misleadingly suggesting that judges do not and ought
not to make policy, and by saying these things because of concerns about
the immediate perceptions of voters in the next election, recent Supreme
Court confirmation hearings might undermine, rather than support, the
idea that judges can be, and are in fact, different from other politicians.
12o. On Northwest Austin, see Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, When Avoiding Federal
Questions Shouldn't Evade Federal Review: Michigan v. Long Meets, and Trumps, Ashwander v. TVA,
12 GREEN BAG 2D 381, 389-9o (2oo9).
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POSTSCRIPT: THE RECENTLY-CONCLUDED HEARINGS FOR JUSTICE KAGAN
As this piece was going to print, the hearings for Elena Kagan were
taking place in the Senate. As was the case with other recent nominees,
she was charming and intelligent, but for the most part not forthcoming
in her specific views of important issues of the day. As was the case with
other recent nominees, she had nothing to gain and potentially
everything to lose by actually saying much that was educational. And as
was the case with other nominees, the Senate let her get away with it.
The Kagan hearings, which will be pored over carefully in the
coming months and years, were (at least at first blush) particularly
disappointing to me for two reasons. First, Justice Kagan did not have
much of a track record, as either a lower court judge or a prolific
academic writer, so that in the absence of a meaningful hearing, the
Senate was put in the unfair position of having to vote based on gut
instincts and trust (or distrust) in the President, rather than on specific
probative information about the kind of constitutional vision she likely
will bring to the Court that could have been unearthed in a better
hearing process.
And second, in a 1995 University of Chicago Law Review Book
Review,' 2' Justice Kagan powerfully criticized a book written by Yale
Law professor Stephen Carter, in which Professor Carter essentially
argued that the Senate should avoid asking specific and substantive
questions about a nominee's constitutional vision, but should instead
largely satisfy itself with an inquiry into the nominee's qualifications,
temperament, and character.
Disagreeing sharply with Carter's view, Justice Kagan labeled the
current state of affairs -in which nominees avoid answering specific
questions ("stonewall[ing]" is the term she uses) about specific
constitutional controversies of our era-a "mess."'22 She characterized
the modern confirmation process as lacking in "seriousness and
substance,"" 3 and as an exercise that "takes on an air of vacuity and
farce."' 24 Kagan observed that without specific questions and meaningful
answers, the Senate isn't doing its job and the country can't learn what it
needs to know; general discussions of philosophies simply are not
revealing enough. Nominee "comments on particular issues" are
necessary.125
121. Elena Kagan, Review: Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (1995)
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)).
122. Id. at 92o.
1 23. Id.
I124. Id.
125. Id. at 936.
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Kagan criticized the Senate for not putting more pressure on the
nominees, and, importantly, she pointed out (albeit without great
elaboration) that recent nominees' reasons for refusing to answer specific
questions-that answers would compromise judicial independence-
were hogwash (an "especial red herring" she termed it).2 b If this reason
for clamming up were right, she correctly observed, then "Justice Scalia
[would be] in a permanent state of recusal, given that in the corpus of his
judicial opinions he has stated unequivocal views on every subject of any
importance." 7
As I suggested above, and in earlier writings," as long as judicial
promises or guarantees are not in play, judicial independence is
respected. For me (and apparently for Professor but not Justice Kagan),
a specific question by the Senate is fair game so long as it does not seek a
promise or a commitment from the nominee, in form or effect, as to how
s/he would rule if confirmed. So I laud Justice Kagan for the views she
expressed in this fifteen-year-old Book Review.
It is a shame that she abandoned these views in her hearings (and
even suggested that she now thinks she was wrong in 1995, an apparent
change of mind that did not seem altogether sincere so much as
pragmatic). And it is a shame that the Senate let her get away with it.
Various Senators did, of course, mention the views she articulated in
1995, but none took her to task for explaining why she wasn't correct in
her (admittedly underdeveloped) argument there. For example, no
Senator ever asked her why, if she was wrong in 1995 and right in 2010
about not being able to discuss things that might come before the Court,
recusal for Justice Scalia and other sitting Justices is not required based
on their past, judicial statements.
Another teachable moment lost. It is a good thing for them that the
Senators don't need passing course credit in this seminar to remain
enrolled in their jobs.
126. Id. at 938.
1 27. Id.
i28. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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